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TRADEMARK

LAW-CONFUSION OVER THE LIKELIHOOD OF
CONFUSION?

Dranoff-Perlstein Associates v. Sklar (1993)
I.

INTRODUCTION

Trademark law promotes fair dealing in the marketplace and reflects the idea that certain forms of competition are unfair and unacceptable.1 The law in this area developed primarily to ensure that
purchasing consumers would not be confused by similarities between
trade symbols of competing merchants. 2 To determine whether a likeli1. 1 J. THOMAS
TITION

MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPE-

§ 2.04, at 2-16 to 2-17 (3d ed. 1992). "[A] basic aspect of the United

States economy is that of the market place policed by laws that set a minimum
level of fair competition." Id. § 2.02, at 2-11. Under the early common law,
prohibitions against "passing off," which developed into modern trademark law,
were a way of enforcing fair dealing in the marketplace. Id. § 2.04, at 2-16; see
also H.R. REP. No. 219, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1945) (statement of Rep. Lanham). Representative Lanham, speaking on behalf of the Committee on Patents, explained that: "Trade-marks ... are the essence of competition, because
they make possible a choice between competing articles by enabling the buyer to
distinguish one from the other. Trademarks encourage the maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the benefit of the good reputation which excellence creates." H.R. REP. No. 219, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1945) (statement of
Rep. Lanham); cf Nicholas S. Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78
TRADEMARK

REP.

523, 523 (1988)

(discussing anticompetitive effects of

trademarks).

2.

MCCARTHY,

supra note 1, § 2.03, at 2-16.

McCarthy states that the law of trademarks and unfair competition prohibits
a seller of merchandise from using a trademark that is confusingly similar to the
trademark of another seller. Id. § 2.04, at 2-16. He explains that "[t]here is a
general consensus of the judiciary and the public that gaining customers by the
use of confusingly similar trademarks is contrary to all current concepts of commercial morality, ethics and fairness." Id. at 2-17.
McCarthy notes that this relationship between "commercial morality" and
trademark protection dates back to the early 20th century, when the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that "the courts look with
suspicion upon one who, in dressing his goods for the market, approaches so
near to his successful rival that the public may fail to distinguish between them."
Id. at 2-18 to 2-19 (quoting Florence Manufacturing Co. v. Dowd, 173 F. 73 (2d
Cir. 1910)); see also H.R. REP. No. 219, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945) (stating
that purpose of trade-mark statute is "to protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trademark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get"); JoHN M.
CALIMAFDE, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION

§ 1.01, at 1 (1970) ("The

primary function of a trademark is to assure purchasers of the source of the
goods, and the standard of quality associated with the source."); Joseph P.
Bauer, A FederalLaw of Unfair Competition: What Should be the Reach of Section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act?, 31 UCLA L. REV. 671, 672 (1984) ("Traditional trademark
law protects a company which has developed a mark or symbol that becomes
associated with its particular goods or services.").

(1317)
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hood of confusion exists between competing symbols, courts generally
balance a variety of factors. 3 The extent to which an appellate court may
review a district court's determination of the likelihood of confusion has
4
produced a split among the courts of appeals.
In Dranoff-PerlsteinAssociates v. Sklar 5 , the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the Third Circuit stated that the determination of likelihood of
confusion is a question of fact, and thus, a district court's determination
may be overturned only if the finding is clearly erroneous. 6 In so holding, the court implicitly rejected the approach of several circuit courts of
appeals, addressing the issue of likelihood of confusion as a mixed question of fact and law reviewable under both the clearly erroneous and de
novo standards of review. 7 Furthermore, the Dranoff-Perlstein court implicitly rejected Third Circuit precedent treating the issue of likelihood
of confusion as a mixed question of law and fact. 8 Moreover, the Third
Circuit in Dranoff-Perlstein did not provide a sufficient explanation for its
reasoning. 9
The results on appeal can vary dramatically depending on whether
an appellate court reviews the issue as a question of law or a question of
fact and, therefore, determining the proper standard of review in trademark cases is essential. 10 A clear articulation of the appropriate standard
3. For a discussion of the criteria that courts use to determine the likelihood of confusion, see infra note 29 and accompanying text.
4. For a further discussion of the standards of review applied by the various
circuits, see infra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
5. 967 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1992).
6. Id. at 862. Questions of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard of review, pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (1990). For a further discussion of Rule 52(a) and the
clearly erroneous standard of review, see infra notes 31-32 and accompanying

text.
7. For a discussion of circuits holding that the likelihood of confusion is a
mixed question of law and fact, see infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Scott Paper v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1229-30
(3d Cir. 1978) (applying mixed standard of review to district court finding of
likelihood of confusion); Opticians Ass'n of Am. v. Independent Opticians of
Am., 920 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1990) (same). For a complete discussion of the
Third Circuit's decision in Scott Paper, see infra notes 42-46 and accompanying
text. For a complete discussion of the Third Circuit's decision in Opticians, see
infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of how the Third Circuit addressed the standard of review for likelihood of confusion in Dranoff-Perlstein Associates v. Sklar, see infra
notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
10. Brett T. Reynolds, Appellate Review of Lanham Act Violations: Is Likelihood
of Confusion a Question of Law or Question of Fact?, 38 Sw. LJ. 743, 752 (1984). In
applying a clearly erroneous standard of review, an appellate court may reverse
a district court decision only when the appellate court firmly believes that the
district court made a mistake. Id. On the other hand, when the appellate court
reviews the issue as a question of law, the court may review the entire case de
novo. Id. For a discussion of the various standards of review and their impact on
appeal, see infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
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of review for the likelihood of confusion is necessary to ensure that practitioners are aware of the extent to which a district court decision is reversible and are able to tailor their arguments on appeal accordingly.
Unfortunately for practitioners in the Third Circuit, the court's recent
pronouncement in Dranoff-Perlstein that likelihood of confusion is a question of fact does little to resolve this issue. I Therefore, the issue re12
mains unsettled in the Third Circuit.
II.

BACKGROUND

A trademark has traditionally been defined as "any word, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof," adopted and used by a
manufacturer or merchant to "identify and distinguish his or her goods
*

.

.from those manufactured or sold by others."' 13 More recently, how-

11. For a discussion of the facts and holding of Dranoff-Perlstein, see infra
notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the impact of the Third Circuit's opinion in DranoffPerlstein, see infra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.
13. Lanham Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988). For a further discussion
of the Lanham Act, see infra notes 15-23 and accompanying text. The definition
of a trademark under the Lanham Act is similar to a definition adopted by the
Supreme Court as early as 1877 in McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 (1877). In
McLean, the Supreme Court stated that "a trade mark may consist of a name,
symbol, figure, letter, form, or device, if adopted and used by a manufacturer or
merchant in order to designate the goods he manufactures or sells to distinguish
the same from those manufactured or sold by another." Id. at 254.
Traditionally, trademark law has safeguarded several interests. See H.R.
REP. No. 219, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1945) (stating that "[t]o protect trademarks ... is to protect the public from deceit, to foster fair competition, and to
secure to the business community the advantages of reputation and goodwill by
preventing their diversion from those who have created them to those who have
not") (statement of Rep. Lanham); Scadia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772
F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that "trademarks reduce the costs consumers incur in searching for what they desire, and the lower the costs of the
search the more competitive the market"), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1147 (1986);
National Color Labs., Inc. v. Philip's Foto Co., 273 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (recognizing public interest in preventing deception of consumers as well
as businessperson's interest in good will and reputation attached to his trademark); MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2.01, at 2-3 (stating that "trademarks protect
the interest of the public in not being deceived ... the owner's interest in not
having the fruits of his labor misappropriated . :..
and the policy of encouraging
competition"); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 270-75 (1988) (asserting that trademark law
promotes economic efficiency in marketplace); see also SIEGRUN D. KANE, TRADEMARK LAw: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 8-10 (1991) (stating that purposes of trade-

mark law are to identify origin, assure qualityand protect good will).
Trademarks also protect the owner's investment of time, money and energy
in his product from misappropriation. H.R. Rep. No. 219, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.
2 (1945) (stating that trademarks protect owners' "energy, time, and money
[spent] presenting to the public the product") (statement of Rep. Lanham); McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2.01 at 2-2 (stating that law of unfair competition protects manufacturer or seller of goods from "having the fruit of his labor
misappropriated"). McCarthy explains that trademarks protect the good will of
an individual's trade or business. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2.07 to 2.08, at 2-
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ever, the term "trademark" has also been used to denote symbols or
words identifying services as well as goods. 14
Modern trademark law in the United States is governed by the Lanham Act of 1946.15 In addition to setting forth the procedural require34 to 2-44. McCarthy defines "good will" as "a business value that reflects the
basic human propensity to continue doing business with a seller who has offered
goods and services that the customer likes and has found adequate to fulfill his
needs." Id. § 2.08, at 2-38. "A trademark 'is merely a convenient means for
facilitating the protection of one's good will in trade by placing a distinguishing
mark or symbol-a commercial signature-upon the merchandise or on the
package in which it is sold.' " Id. § 2.07, at 2-36 (quoting United Drug Co. v.
Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918)). McCarthy also notes that "the
good will symbolized by a service mark has been said to be synonymous with the
term 'reputation.' " Id. at 2-37 (citing Budget System, Inc., v. Budget Loan &
Finance Plan, 361 P.2d 512 (Utah 1961)).

Trademark law also protects the consuming public from confusing or deceptive trade practices. H.R. Rep. No. 219, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945) (stating that "trademarks protect[] the public against spurious and falsely marked

goods") (statement of Rep. Lanham). "Confusion of the public is the essence of
both trademark infringement and unfair competition." MCCARTHY, supra note 1,
§ 2.12, at 2-59 (quoting Dart Drug Corp. v. Schering Corp., 320 F.2d 745, 748
n. 10 (D.C. Cir. 1963)). Trademark law was intended "for the protection of...

the public-that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and
the credulous, who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze, but are governed by appearance and general impressions." Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati,
166 F.2d 348, 359 (9th Cir. 1948) (quoting Florence Manufacturing Co. v. J.C.
Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910)). Thus, as Professor McCarthy illustrates, trademark law protects the housewife who purchases "JEM" soap thinking it is "GEM" soap. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2.12, at 2-60. The Supreme
Court has held that the public has a right to be protected from deception and
confusion, as well as the right to "get what it chooses, though the choice may be
dictated by caprice or by fashion or perhaps by ignorance." Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 78 (1934).
Finally, trademarks protect the public interest in a competitive market and
economic efficiency. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 2.01[2], at 2-3. Professor McCarthy asserts that trademarks promote efficiency in the marketplace by (1) encouraging the production of quality products, and (2) reducing for the customer
the cost of making purchasing decisions. Id. Customers do not incur wasteful
expenses when they remember the name or trademark of a product they like and
are able to keep buying it. Landes & Posner, supra, at 270. This encourages
manufacturers to maintain the quality of their product. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No.
219, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1945) ("Trade-marks encourage the maintenance
of quality by securing to the producer the benefit of the good reputation excellence creates.") (statement of Rep. Lanham).
14. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 3.01, at 3-2; see also KANE, supra note 13, at 2
(contrasting trademarks with service marks). The Lanham Act defines a service
mark as "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof ... to
identify and distinguish the services of one person . . . from the services of
others." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988). The same legal requirements apply to service
marks and trademarks. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 3.01, at 3-2. Examples of service marks include the names of department stores, such as Macy's, banks, such
as Citibank, or restaurants, such as Maxims. KANE, supra note 13, at 3.
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988). Trademark law originated in the early
19th century as an offshoot of the tort of fraud called "palming off." MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 5.02, at 5-3. "Palming off" referred to the act of passing
off one's own "goods as the goods of another." Id. Although the consumer was
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ments for federal registration of a trade symbol, 16 section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act protects unregistered trademarks from infringement, by providing owners with a claim for false designation of origin. 17 Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act proscribes the use "in commerce [of] any word,
term, name, symbol, or device ... or any false designation of origin,
false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which ... is likely to cause confusion."' 8
the victim of the fraud, the seller whose mark was infringed upon brought the
action against the defendant. Id. § 2.12, at 2-59. Throughout most of the 19th
century, the element of fraudulent intent was the key issue in trademark infringement cases. Id. § 5.02, at 5-4. By the 20th century, the emphasis shifted
from the fraudulent intent of the infringing party to the effect that confusingly
similar marks would have on consumers. Id. For a more detailed discussion of
the history of trademarks see, MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5.01-5.04, at 5-1 to 514; Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 73 TRADEMARK
REP. 222 (1983); and Daphne Robert Leeds, Trademarks-OurAmerican Concept
and Confusion and Consumer Policy, 72 TRADEMARK REP. 439 (1982).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1127 (1988). In order to claim rights to a trademark,

a merchant must first put the mark into use. See SIDNEY A. DIAMOND, TRADEMARK
PROBLEMS AND How TO AVOID THEM 6 (1981) (detailing registration process).
Once the mark has been used in commerce, the owner of the mark may apply for
registration of the mark. Id. After the owner applies for registration, the Patent
and Trademark Office determines whether the chosen symbol is properly registerable. Id.at 7. A trademark is properly registerable if it is sufficiently distinctive and does not include marks that are expressly prohibited. Id. For a more
complete discussion of the requirements of a properly registerable mark, see
infra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
Upon determining that the mark meets the requirements for registration,
the Patent and Trademark Office advertises the new mark in a bulletin in order
to notify the public. Id. at 9. Notification allows anyone using a similar mark,
who thinks the new mark is likely to cause confusion, time to contest the proposed mark. Id. If no one opposes the registration, the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks issues a registration certificate to the applicant. Id. The
new trademark then protects its owner from other individuals attempting to use
a mark that is so similar that confusion is likely to result. Id.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1988). The Supreme Court of the United States in
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2753, 2757 (1992), acknowledged that section 43(a) of the Lanham Act protects "qualifying unregistered
trademarks" from misappropriation. Id. at 2757. The Supreme Court also
noted that the same principles that qualify a trademark for registration under the
Lanham Act determine whether an unregistered mark is entitled to protection
under section 43(a). Id.
Although registration is not required in order to obtain trademark protection, registration does grant certain benefits. DIAMOND, supra note 16, at 11.
Registration constitutes legal notice to potential infringers of the owner's rights
to the registered mark. Id. The proprietor of a registered trademark is also entitled to more damages from an infringer than the proprietor of an unregistered
mark. Id. Finally, after five years of continuous use after registration, the
owner's rights to the trademark "become incontestible," and the registered
mark cannot be challenged in court. Id.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1988); see also A.J. Canfield v. Honickman, 808
F.2d 291, 296 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that "unlicensed use of a designation serving the function of a registered mark constitutes a false designation of origin and
a false description or representation").
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Stating a Claim Under Section 43(a)

In order to bring an action for trademark infringement of an unregistered mark, a merchant must meet two requirements. First, the
merchant must establish that the unregistered mark is sufficiently distinctive to receive protection under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.' 9
Second, the merchant must establish that consumers are likely to con20
fuse his or her unregistered mark with the competitor's mark.
An unregistered designation is sufficiently distinctive if it clearly
identifies the goods and services of one merchant or service provider
and distinguishes them from the goods and services of the alleged infringer. 2 1 Courts have categorized marks into four levels of distinctiveness: (1) arbitrary or fanciful marks; (2) suggestive marks; (3)
descriptive marks; and (4) generic marks. 2 2 A mark's category of distinctiveness solely determines the level of protection that the mark re23
ceives under the Lanham Act.
Arbitrary and fanciful marks are "inherently distinctive" and therefore, automatically qualify for trademark protection. 2 4 A suggestive
mark also qualifies for automatic trademark protection. 2 5 In contrast, a
19. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2758.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 2757.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11.02, at 11-8 to 11-9. McCarthy has described a fanciful mark as "a word which is coined for the express purpose of
functioning as a trademark." Id. at 11-9. Examples of popular fanciful marks
include: XEROX, KODAK, SANKA, and CLOROX. Id. § 11.03, at 11-13.
In contrast, an arbitrary mark is a mark that has an ordinary meaning, but is
applied to the good or service in a completely arbitrary and non-descriptive
manner. Id. § 11.04, at 11-14. For example, IVORY is a brand of soap, but
IVORY soap is not made of ivory. Id. at 11-15. Therefore, using the term
"ivory" to denote a particular manufacturer's soap is arbitrary. Id. Other examples include, CAMEL cigarettes, SHELL gasoline and ARM & HAMMER baking
soda. Id. at 11-18.
Although arbitrary and fanciful marks differ in these respects, the Lanham
Act affords both types of marks a broad degree of protection. Id. § 11.02, at 118 to 11-9. For a further discussion of these levels of distinctiveness, see KANE,
supra note 13, at 17-54; MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §§ 11.02-11.04, at 11-8 to 1118.
25. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11.20, at 11-102. A suggestive trademark is
one that "merely suggest[s] some quality or ingredient of goods." Id. As with
arbitrary and fanciful marks, a suggestive mark is deemed sufficiently distinctive
and is afforded broad trademark protection immediately upon use. Id.
It is often difficult to discern the distinction between suggestive and descriptive marks. Id. at 11-104 to 11-105. The most popular test for determining
whether a mark is suggestive, formulated by McCarthy, measures the degree of
imagination and inventiveness required of the customer in identifying the mark
with a product. Id. § 11.21, at 11-106 to 11-115. McCarthy explains that "the
more imagination that is required on the customer's part to get some direct
description of the product from the term, the more likely the term is suggestive,
not descriptive." Id. at 11-107; see also Railroad Salvage of Conn., Inc. v. Rail-
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descriptive mark is only protected if it has acquired secondary meaning
by describing some characteristic or ingredient of the product that customers identify with the claimant's product. 26 Finally, generic marks re27
ceive no protection under the Lanham Act.
Once an unregistered mark is deemed sufficiently distinctive, the
owner of the mark must prove that the alleged infringer's mark is likely
to cause confusion in the marketplace. 2 8 In evaluating the likelihood of
confusion, courts balance a variety of factors, including the similarity of
the marks, as well as evidence of actual confusion and the intent to
confuse.29
road Salvage, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 1014, 1020 (D.R.I. 1983) (using imagination
test to determine whether mark is suggestive); Stix Prod., Inc. v. United
Merchants & Mfg., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (same).
McCarthy has included the following trademarks as examples of suggestive
marks: CHICKEN OF THE SEA tuna fish; COPPERTONE suntan oil; HANDI
WIPES dust cloths; Q-TIPS wooden sticks with cotton on the end. MCCARTHY,
supra note 1, § 11.23, at 11-118 to 11-124. For a further discussion of the distinctiveness of suggestive marks, see KANE, supra note 13, at 17-54; MCCARTHY,
supra note 1, §§ 11.20-11.23, at 11-102 to 11-124.
26. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11.05, at 11-19. "A mark is 'descriptive' if it
is descriptive of: the intended purpose, function or use of the goods; the size of
the goods, the class of users of the goods, a desirable characteristic of the goods,
or the end effect upon the user." Id. at 11-20. "[Tlrademark protection is extended only where the user has proven secondary meaning ....
" Id. § 11.09, at
11-40. McCarthy defines this secondary meaning as "recognition of consumer
acceptance and recognition of such marks as denoting only one seller or
source." Id. Examples of descriptive trademarks include: HOLIDAY INN, RAISIN BRAN, CHAP STICK, and BUFFERIN. Id. § 11.08, at 11-31 to 11-40.
For a further discussion of the distinctiveness of descriptive marks, see
KANE, supra note 13, at 17-54; MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §§ 11.05-11.19, at 11-19
to 11-102.
27. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 12.01[1], at 12-4. "The test for genericness
is whether consumers think the term represents 'the generic name of the product [or service] or a mark indicating merely one source of that product [or service].' " Dranoff-Perlstein Assoc. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 859 (3d Cir. 1992)
(quotingJ. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 12.2,
at 522 (2d ed. 1984)). A term that is deemed generic "can never function as a
mark to identify and distinguish the products of only one seller." MCCARTHY,
supra note 1, § 12.01, at 12-4. The test for genericness, as McCarthy explains,
asks "what does the public think the word connotes-the generic name of the
product or a mark indicating merely one source of that product?" Id. § 12.02, at
12-8. Examples of terms considered generic include: ASPIRIN; CELLOPHANE; COLA; DRY ICE; and ESCALATOR. Id. § 12.03, at 12-32 to 12-40.
However, names such as COKE and POLAROID, though commonly used, are
not generic. Id. § 12.04, at 12-40 to 12-44.
For a further discussion of genericness, see MCCARTHY, supra note 1,
§§ 12.01-12.18, at 12-1 to 12-115; Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trade-

marked Generic Words, 89

TRADEMARK REP.

1323 (1980) .

28. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2753, 2758 (1992).
"[T]he keystone of that portion of unfair competition law which relates to trademarks is the avoidance of a likelihood of confusion in the minds of the buying
public." MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2.03, at 2-16. For a general discussion of
the likelihood of confusion standard, see Reynolds, supra note 10, at 747-52.
29. See Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, 589 F.2d 1225, 1229 (3d Cir.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1993

7

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [1993], Art. 17

1324
B.

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38: p. 1317

Standard of Review for Determination of Likelihood of Confusion

A great deal of conflict exists among the circuits as to whether a
finding of likelihood of confusion is a question of law, a question of fact,
or a mixed question of law and fact. 30 Determining whether this issue is
1978). The Third Circuit in Scott Paper balanced 10 factors to determine the
likelihood of confusion between two competing marks. Id. These factors are: 1)
the degree of similarity between the two marks; 2) the strength of the owner's
mark; 3) the price of the goods and other factors indicative of care and attention
expected of consumers when making a purchase; 4) the length of time the defendant has used the mark without evidence of actual confusion; 5) the intent of
the defendant in adopting the mark; 6) the evidence of actual confusion; 7)
whether the goods, though not competing, are marketed through the same
channels of trade and advertised through the same media; 8) the extent to
which the targets of the parties' sales efforts are the same; 9) the relationship of
the goods in the minds of the public because of the similarity of function; 10)
other facts suggesting that the consuming public might expect the prior owner
to manufacture a product in the defendant's market. Id.
Other circuits use different combinations of these 10 Scott Paper factors. See,
e.g., Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 584
(2d Cir. 1993) (balancing strength of plaintiff's mark, degree of similarity between two marks, proximity of products, likelihood that prior owner will bridge
gap, actual confusion, defendant's good faith in adopting own mark, quality of
defendant's product and sophistication of buyers); Homeowners Group, Inc. v.
Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1106 (6th Cir. 1991) (balancing
strength of plaintiff's mark, relatedness of services, similarities of marks, evidence of actual confusion, marketing channels used, likely degree of purchaser
care and sophistication, intent of defendant in selecting mark and likelihood of
expansion of product lines using the mark); Keds Corp. v. Renee Intern Trading
Corp., 888 F.2d 215, 222 (1st Cir. 1989) (balancing similarity of mark, similarity
of goods, relationship between parties' channels of trade, relationship between
the parties' advertising, classes of prospective purchasers, evidence of actual
confusion, defendant's intent in adopting the mark, and strength of the mark);
Dieter v. B & H Indus. of S.W. Fla., Inc., 880 F.2d 322, 326 (11 th Cir. 1989)
(balancing type of mark, similarity of mark, similarity between products that
marks represent, similarity of parties' retail outlets and customers, similarity of
advertising media used, defendant's intent, actual confusion), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 950 (1990); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 1179
(9th Cir. 1988) (balancing strength or weakness of marks, similarity in appearance, sound and meaning, class of goods in question, marketing channels, evidence of actual confusion and intent of defendant); Oreck Corp. v. United States
Floor Sys., Inc., 803 F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir. 1986) (balancing strength of plaintiff's mark, similarity between marks, similarity of products, identity of retail outlets and purchasers, similarity of advertising media used, defendant's intent,
actual confusion, and degree of care exercised by potential purchasers), reh 'g
denied, 808 F.2d 56, cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987); Union Carbide Corp. v.
Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 381-82 (7th Cir.) (balancing type of trademark at
issue, similarity of design, similarity of products, identity of retail outlets and
purchasers, identity of advertising media utilized, defendant's intent and actual
confusion), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976).
30. See, e.g., Paddington Corp., 996 F.2d at 584-85 (holding that likelihood of
confusion is reviewable under mixed clearly erroneous and de novo standard of
review); In re Hearst Corp., 982 F.2d 493, 494 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that
likelihood of confusion is reviewable under de novo standard of review); Ocean
Garden, Inc. v. Marktrade Co., 953 F.2d 500, 506 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding likelihood of confusion reviewable under clearly erroneous standard of review). For
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a question of fact or a question of law is crucial in ascertaining the appropriate standard of review. Pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, an appellate court must apply a clearly erroneous standard of review to district court findings of fact. 3 ' The clearly
erroneous standard provides a very limited scope of review for appellate
courts because the lower court's findings of fact may only be set aside if
they are unsupported by the evidence presented at trial.3 2 Conversely,
an appellate court may review conclusions of law under the de novo standard, which provides the appellate court with plenary review over all
legal questions. 3 3 The extent to which an appellate court may overturn
a lower court decision will have a conclusive effect on the outcome of an
appeal, and consequently, may determine the resolution of the case.
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and
the Ninth Circuit have recently held that a finding of the likelihood of
confusion is a factual issue, reviewable under a clearly erroneous standard of review. 34 In adopting the clearly erroneous standard of review
a more detailed discussion of the split among the circuits, see 2 MCCARTHY, supra
note 1, § 23.22, at 23-137 to 23-148.
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to resolve this split among the
circuitsin Elby's Big Boy, Inc. v. Frisch's Restaurant, Inc., 459 U.S. 916 (1982).
However, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Id. Justice White dissented to
the denial, arguing that the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to resolve the
split in the lower courts on the appropriate standard of review for findings of
likelihood of confusion. Id. at 927 (White J., dissenting).
One commentator has noted that even the legislative history of the 1946
Lanham Act does not shed any light on the issue of an appropriate standard of
review. BurtonJ. Rubin, The Role of the Clearly Erroneous Standard of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure52(a) in Reviewing Trial Court Detenninationsof Likelihood or No Likelihood of Confusion, 74 TRADEMARK REP. 20, 33 (1982). For the legislative history of
the 1946 Lanham Act, see H.R. REP. No. 219, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) and
S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.S. 1274.
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that: "[findings of fact ... shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." Id.
32. United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1947). "A finding of
fact is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed." Id.; see also American Home Prods. Corp. v.
Barr Labs., Inc., 834 F.2d 368, 371 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting that finding of fact is
clearly erroneous "if it is completely devoid of a credible evidentiary basis or
bears no rational relationship to the supporting data").

33. 9 CHARLES
PROCEDURE § 2588,

A.

WRIGHT

& ARTHUR R.

MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

at 750 (1971). Rule 52(a) is silent as to the standard of
review for conclusions of law. Id. "This silence has been correctly interpreted
as meaning that the 'clearly erroneous' restriction is not applicable and that the
trial court's rulings on questions of law are reviewable without any such limitation." Id. A de novo trial is one in which the matter is tried anew. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY

435 (6th ed. 1990).

34. See Ocean Garden, Inc. v. Marktrade Co., 953 F.2d 500, 509 (9th Cir.
1991) ("The Ninth Circuit has, since 1985, taken a finding of a likelihood of
confusion to be a factual finding to be overturned only if clearly erroneous.");
Forum Corp. v. Forum, Ltd., 903 F.2d 434, 438 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[T]rial court's

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1993

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [1993], Art. 17

1326

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38: p. 1317

for a district court determination of the likelihood of confusion, these
circuits have held that a reviewing court must give deference to a district
court's balancing of factors and ultimate determination that a likelihood
35
of confusion exists.
Conversely, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that the issue of the likelihood of confusion is a question of
ultimate conclusion on the likelihood of confusion is a finding of fact" reviewable under a clearly erroneous standard of review.); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue
Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) ("We hold that henceforth the clearly erroneous standard should be applied in reviewing a trial
court's determination concerning likelihood of confusion.").
One commentator has advocated assessing the issue of likelihood of confusion as a finding of fact. See Reynolds, supra note 10, at 773. Reynolds has argued that the circuit courts that have treated the issue as one of law, rather than
fact, have expanded the scope of review to create multiple grounds for reversal..
Id. According to Reynolds, "[t]his approach bypasses the boundaries of appellate review that are necessary to ensure the functional integrity of district
courts." Id. Reynolds has recognized, however, that treating this issue as one of
fact will virtually proscribe the use of summary judgment in Lanham Act claims
because summary judgment cannot resolve question of fact. Id. As a result, the
number of unmeritorious claims that proceed to trial will increase significantly.
Id. However, Reynolds has contended that this problem of efficiency is outweighed by the importance of giving the appellate courts unrestricted review.
Id. Reynolds has warned that treating the issue of likelihood of confusion as a
question of law creates an unrestricted framework and that such unchecked review would likely render numerous district court decisions "vacuous." Id.; see
also Janet Shiffler Thomas, Comment, Likelihood of Confusion Under the Lanham Act:
A Question of Fact, a Question of Law, or Both?, 73 Ky. L.J. 235, 252-53 (1984-1985)
(concluding that likelihood of confusion is more appropriately viewed as question of fact because it cannot be assessed by inflexible formulae).
35. See, e.g., Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1355 n.4
(9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). Levi Strauss, a clothing manufacturer, brought an
action for false designation of origin against a competitor, Blue Bell, alleging
that Blue Bell violated Levi Strauss' trademark rights to a horizontal pocket tab.
Id. at 1354. The district court held that Levi Strauss' tab had not acquired secondary meaning, and therefore, it was not sufficiently distinctive to warrant
trademark protection. Id. Moreover, the district court held that even if the tab
had acquired secondary meaning, Blue Bell's use of a shirt tab was not likely to
be confused with Levi Strauss' tab. Id.
On appeal, the plaintiff Strauss argued that the lower court did not apply
the multifactor balancing previously set forth by the Ninth Circuit to determine
the likelihood of confusion. Id. at 1360. Strauss maintained that the trial court
relied too heavily on retailers from Blue Bell who testified that in their experience, they did not believe that Blue Bell's pocket tab would confuse customers.
Id. at 1360-61.
The Ninth Circuit held that the reliance on actual confusion was "the prerogative of the district court" and their "job as an appellate court [is] not to
reweigh the evidence." Id. at 1360. The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court
decision that no likelihood of confusion existed, concluding that this determination was not clearly erroneous. Id. at 1361.
More recently, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its position that the likelihood
of confusion is a question of fact reviewable under a clearly erroneous standard
of review. See Ocean Garden, Inc. v. Marktrade Co., 953 F.2d 500, 509 (9th Cir.
1991) (reviewing likelihood of confusion under clearly erroneous standard of
review).
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law reviewable under a de novo standard of review.3 6 The Federal Circuit
defines both the underlying evidentiary factors, as well as the ultimate
37
determination of the likelihood of confusion as questions of law.
Finally, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and
Sixth Circuits have held that the determination of the likelihood of confusion is a mixed question of law and fact.3 8 These circuits reason that
while the foundational factors controlling the likelihood of confusion
are findings of fact subject to the clearly erroneous rule, the ultimate
determination of the likelihood of confusion is a question of law, subject
36. See In re Hearst Corp., 982 F.2d 493, 494 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("Determination of likelihood of confusion . . .is reviewed as a question of law based on
findings of relevant underlying facts."); see also Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's
Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (same).
37. Giant Food, 710 F.2d at 1569. The applicant, Nation's Foodservice,
sought to register the mark "GIANT HAMBURGERS" and an accompanying
design for its restaurant. Id. at 1566. Giant Food opposed the applicant's mark
claiming that the applicant's mark was likely to be confused with Giant Food's
mark "GIANT FOOD" and its accompanying design, which was used for its supermarket services and private food label. Id. at 1567. The Trademark and Appeals Board dismissed Giant Food's opposition to National Foodservice's mark.
Id. at 1566.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit in Giant Food held that "the issue of likelihood of confusion is the ultimate conclusion of law to be decided by the court,
and ... the clearly erroneous rule is not applicable." Id. at 1569. The Federal
Circuit stated that to determine likelihood of confusion, a court must apply a
multifactor balancing test. Id. at 1569 (citing Application of E.I. Du Pont De
Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973)). The Federal Circuit
Court then reweighed all of the factors and concluded that the applicant's proposed mark was likely to cause confusion with the opposer's mark. Id. at 1571.
Thus, the Federal Circuit Court concluded that the decision of the Trademark
and Appeals Board should be reversed, and the applicant should be denied registration of its mark. Id.
In a subsequent case, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed its conclusion in Giant
Food that the determination of likelihood of confusion is a question of law subject to de novo review on appeal. In re Hearst, 982 F.2d at 494; see also Thomas,
Comment, supra note 34, at 240- 43 (concluding that Giant Food analysis indicates
that de novo review applies to ultimate issue and underlying factors).
38. See Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577,
584-85 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that district court findings regarding factors assessing likelihood of confusion are subject to clearly erroneous standard of review, but ultimate determination of likelihood of confusion is reviewable de
novo); Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1242 (6th Cir. 1991) (same).
One commentator has advocated this mixed standard of review, analogizing
the "likelihood of confusion" test in trademark law to the "obviousness" test in
patent law. Rubin, supra note 30, at 34. Rubin has asserted that, in patent law,
the overwhelming weight of authority rejects treating obviousness, which is the
gravamen of patent protection, as a question of fact. Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 103
(1988)). Rubin has further maintained that similar to obviousness, the likelihood of confusion requires a "conditional determination," which is a determination drawn from facts and inferences that cannot be scientifically proven. Id.
Therefore, Rubin has concluded that likelihood of confusion should be considered an ultimate conclusion of law, based on underlying evidentiary facts, which
would be subject to a clearly erroneous standard. Id.
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39
to de novo review.

Inconsistency in the standard of review for the likelihood of confusion exists not only among the circuit courts of appeals, but also within
the various circuits. 40 A discussion of the Third Circuit caselaw on the
issue reveals, for example, that the Third Circuit has been very inconsistent in applying one standard of review to the question. 4 1
In Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc. ,42 the Third Circuit held
39. See Paddington, 996 F.2d at 584-85 (stating that appellate court reviews
factors determining likelihood of confusion under clearly erroneous standard of
review but reviews ultimate determination of likelihood of confusion de novo);
Esercizio, 944 F.2d at 1242 (same); see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23.22, at
23-137 to 23-149. McCarthy notes thatJudge Frank of the Second Circuit first
proposed that an appellate court could review the district court's findings as to
the likelihood of confusion de novo when the finding was based on the district
judge's own assessment of the evidence. Id. at 23-140 (citing Eastern Wine
Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 758
(1943)). Judge Frank, in Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d
955 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 758 (1943), reasoned that when the trial
court's finding is not based on testimony, but solely on a comparison between
the two competing trademarks, the appellate court is in as good a position as the
trial court to determine the likelihood of confusion between the two marks.
Eastern Wine, 137 F.2d at 959-60. Therefore,Judge Frank concluded that when a
determination of likelihood of confusion is based simply on a comparison of the
two marks, the appellate court has plenary review. Id. For a further discussion
of the Second Circuit's approach under the Eastern Wine test, see Reynolds, supra
note 10, at 757-58 (noting that Second Circuit created "similarity of marks" exception to clearly erroneous standard of review when determination of likelihood of confusion depends on comparison between two marks). This similarity
of the marks exception was expressly repudiated in a recent Second Circuit decision. Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 585
(2d Cir. 1993).
Today, the Second Circuit holds that the determination of likelihood of confusion is a legal conclusion, thus reviewable under a de novo standard. See id. at
584-85; Centaur Communications, 830 F.2d at 1225; Plus Prods. v. Plus Discount
Foods, Inc., 722 F.2d 999, 1004-05 (2d Cir. 1983). The Second Circuit maintains, however, that the district court's findings as to the factors determining
likelihood of confusion are findings of fact reviewable under a clearly erroneous
standard of review. See Paddington,996 F.2d at 584-85; Centaur, 830 F.2d at 1225;
Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 873 (2d Cir.
1986).
The Sixth Circuit has also applied a mixed standard of review to the likelihood of confusion. See Little Caesar Enter. v. Pizza Caesar, Inc., 834 F.2d 568,
570 (6th Cir. 1987) ("[F]oundational factors are factual and subject to a clearly
erroneous standard of review, while the weighing of these findings on the ultimate issue of likelihood of confusion is a question of law."); see also Esercizio, 944
F.2d at 1242 ("A district court's findings regarding each factor are reviewed for
clear error, but further determination of likelihood of confusion based on those
factors is a legal conclusion reviewed de novo.").
40. For a discussion of the equivocal approach of the United States Court
of Appeals for Eight Circuit, see 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23.22, at 23-146.
41. For a discussion of the equivocal approach of the Third Circuit, see
supra notes 47-62 and accompanying text.
42. 589 F.2d 1225 (3d Cir. 1978). The court in Scott Paper addressed
whether the surname Scott, a registered trademark for paper and plastic household items, had acquired secondary meaning that would bar its use for Scott's
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that in reviewing a district court's findings on the likelihood of confusion, an appellate court must apply a clearly erroneous standard of review to the various findings of fact. 4 3 The Third Circuit further held,
however, that an appellate court may subject the inferences drawn from
those basic facts, known as "ultimate facts," to a less stringent standard
of review. 4 4 In reaching its decision, the Scott Paper court reasoned that
when the determination of a case hinges on documentary evidence,
rather than witness credibility, an appellate court is in a position equal
to that of a district court to evaluate and weigh the evidence. 4 5 Therefore, the Scott Paper court concluded that a reviewing court need not be
46
constrained by the stringent clearly erroneous standard of review.
The Third Circuit specifically rejected the Scott Paper approach,
however, in American Home Products v. Barr Laboratories.4 7 The American
Liquid Gold furniture polish, a non-competing product, and whether a likelihood of confusion between the two trade names existed. Id. at 1227.
Scott Paper sells paper and plastic household items nationwide, producing
annual revenues of $450 million. Id. at 1228. Scott's Liquid Gold began as a
local manufacturer of furniture polish in the Denver, Colorado area. Id. at 1227.
During the 1950s, the company launched efforts to nationalize the business. Id.
In 1971, Scott's Liquid Gold applied to register the trademark "Scott's Liquid
Gold." Id. Scott Paper challenged the trademark as confusingly similar to its
own name and trademark. Id. at 1228.
43. Id. at 1229 n.3.
44. Id. The Scott court based this conclusion on an early Third Circuit case
that held that inferences drawn from facts are subject to a lower standard of
review. Id. (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Johnson, 219 F.2d 590, 591 (3d Cir.
1955)). In Sears, Roebuck, the Third Circuit held that Rule 52(a) "is not applicable where ...

the dispute is not as to the basic facts, but as to what inference

(i.e., ultimate fact) should reasonably be derived from the basic facts." Sears,
Roebuck, 219 F.2d at 591.
One commentator has suggested that in light of all of the factual findings
that the Scott Paper court reversed, it appeared as though the court applied a de
novo standard of review to the entire case, including the underlying facts, rather
than simply applying a de novo standard of review to the ultimate facts. Reynolds, supra note 10, at 761-62.
45. Scott Paper, 589 F.2d at 1229 n.3. The Scott Paper court based this reasoning on several earlier Third Circuit cases that held that when there is no issue
of credibility to be assessed, the appellate court is in as good a position as the
district court to evaluate the evidence; therefore, the reviewing court may independently evaluate the evidence. Id. (citing In re Multidistrict Litigation, 540
F.2d 601, 603 (3d Cir. 1976)).

The analysis of the Third Circuit in the Scott Paper case was the same analysis
applied by the Second Circuit in Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd.,
137 F.2d 955, 959-60 (2d Cir. 1943). For a further discussion of the Eastern Wine
case and the Second Circuit's reasoning, see supra note 39 and accompanying
text.
46. Scott Paper, 589 F.2d at 1229 n.3.
47. 834 F.2d 368, 370 n.2 (3d Cir. 1987). In American Home Products, the
Third Circuit considered whether the district court erred in concluding that no
likelihood of confusion existed between the plaintifFs brown ibuprofen tablet
known as ADVIL and the defendant's brown ibuprofen pill. Id. at 369.

American Home Products (AHP), the plaintiff, manufactures ADVIL, an
ibuprofen tablet. Id. The tablet is brown and glossy with the letters A-D-V-I-L
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Home Products court held that the issue of the likelihood of confusion was
48
a question of fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.
Therefore, an appellate court may reverse a lower court's decision only
if the appellate court determines that the district court's conclusion
49
bears no reasonable relationship to the evidence at trial.
In reaching this conclusion, the American Home Products court first
explained that the Scott Paper court's distinction between "basic facts,"
which it reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, and "ultimate
facts," which it reviewed under de novo standard, was "no longer tenable
in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Pullman-Standard v. Swint."' 50 The Supreme Court in Pullman held that Rule 52(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which applies the clearly erroneous standard of review to findings of fact, does not divide facts into categories subjecting certain factual findings to less stringent standards of
review and others to a clearly erroneous standard. 5 1 Thus, the American
Home Products court noted that all factual findings are subject to a single
clearly erroneous standard of review. 52 Therefore, the American Home
Products court held that to the extent that the Scott Paper court justified a
de novo standard of review on the reasoning that the likelihood of confusion is a question of "ultimate fact," the holding in Scott Paper was
53
untenable.
The American Home Products court further reasoned that amendments
to the language of Rule 52(a), enacted after the Scott Paper decision, invalidated the distinction that the Scott Paper court made between docuprinted on the surface. Id.The defendant began marketing a similarly-sized,
brown ibuprofen tablet under the brand names of various retailers. Id. The
plaintiff AHP filed a trademark infringement action against the defendant Barr,
to enjoin the sale of the defendant's brown ibuprofen tablet. Id. Before addressing the merits of the case, the Third Circuit discussed the issue of an appropriate standard of review for a determination of the likelihood of confusion.
Id. at 370.
48. Id.
49. Id. Although the Third Circuit acknowledged the differing views
among the circuits as to the proper standard of review for the question of the
likelihood of confusion, the court concluded that a clearly erroneous standard
was the proper standard of review. Id. The court defined a clearly erroneous
finding as one that is "completely devoid of a credible evidentiary basis or bears
no rational relationship to the supporting data." Id. at 371.
50. Id. at 370 n.2 (relying on Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273
(1982)). In Pullman-Standard, the Supreme Court addressed the appropriate
standard of review for a district court finding of discriminatory purpose in cases
arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Pullman-Standard,456 U.S. at 273.
51. Pullman-Standard,456 U.S. at 287. For the pertinent language of Rule
52(a), see supra note 29 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court made clear
in Pullman-Standard that findings of fact were not to be divided into "ultimate
facts" and "subsidiary facts." Id.
52. American Home Products, 834 F.2d at 370 n.2.
53. Id.
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mentary and oral evidence. 54 The Scott Paper court had reasoned that
when a trademark infringement case is based primarily on documentary
evidence, the appellate court is in as good a position to assess the evidence and therefore, should not be constrained by a clearly erroneous
standard of review. 55 The amendments to Rule 52(a), however, require
reviewing courts to apply a clearly erroneous standard of review to all
findings of fact, regardless of whether they are based on oral testimony
and witness credibility or on documentary evidence. 56 Accordingly, the
American Home Products court rejected the Scott Paper court's distinction
and held that appellate courts are subject to a clearly erroneous stan57
dard of review when reviewing findings of fact pursuant to Rule 52(a).
The Third Circuit next addressed the issue of the proper standard
of review for findings of the likelihood of confusion in Opticians Association of America v. Independent Opticians of America.58 In Opticians, the Opticians Association of America (OAA) brought an action to enjoin former
members of their group from using IOA as the guild mark for their
newly formed organization. 5 9 Determining the propriety of a preliminary injunction, the Third Circuit had to assess whether the Opticians
Association of America could prove that there was a likelihood of confu54. Id. at 370 (stating that to extent that circuits justify de novo review "on
the perception that appellate courts are in as good a position as trial courts to
evaluate evidence of likelihood of confusion, the validity of this approach has
been largely undermined by the 1985 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)").
55. Scott Paper, 589 F.2d at 1229 n.3.
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (1990). The pertinent language of Rule 52(a)
states that "[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not
be set aside unless clearly erroneous." Id. (emphasis added).
57. American Home Products, 834 F.2d at 370. The Third Circuit in American
Home Products firmly held that "Rule 52(a) now requires appellate courts to apply
the clearly erroneous standard to all findings of fact." Id.
58. 920 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1990).
59. Id. In the 1920s, the Guild of Prescription Opticians (GPOA) was
formed to represent the interests of opticians nationwide and establish optical
service standards. Id. at 190. In 1972, the GPOA changed its name to the OAA.
Id. These two guild marks and many others used by the organization were federally registered trademarks. Id. In 1989, a New Jersey guild defected from the
OAA and formed its own guild known as the IOA. Id. at 191. Subsequently, the
OAA sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin OIA from using any of the
OAA's guild marks in connection with the sale, distribution or advertising of
IOA's goods and services. Id.
The district court denied OAA's request for a preliminary injunction, holding that the federal registration of OAA's marks was invalid because the marks
were mischaracterized, and had been used as certification marks despite their
federal registration. Id. On appeal, the Third Circuit addressed the propriety of
the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction. Id. The Third Circuit
stated that a court must consider the plaintiff's probability of success at trial in
assessing whether a preliminary injunction is an appropriate remedy. Id. at 19192. The Third Circuit concluded that the trial court had erred in holding that
OAA's federal registration was invalid. Id.
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sion between the guild marks OAA and 10A. 60 The Third Circuit reaffirmed that the likelihood of confusion is a question of fact reviewable
under the clearly erroneous standard of review. 6 1 However, the Third
Circuit in Opticians further held that where no dispute exists as to the
relevant facts, an appellate court's review of the likelihood of confusion
is plenary. 6 2 It was within this legal framework that the Third Circuit
63
decided Dranoff-PerlsteinAssociates v. Sklar.
Ill.

FACTS

In Dranoff-Perlstein Associates v. Sklar, 6 4 both the plaintiff, DranoffPerlstein Associates, and the defendant, Harris J. Sklar, specialized in
personal injury law in the Philadelphia area. 6 5 In 1984, Dranoff-Perlstein began an advertising campaign that included the use of the mnemonic I-N-J-U-R-Y-1 as the firm's telephone number. 66 Five years later,
Harris J. Sklar began a similar advertising campaign and employed I-NJ-U-R-Y-9 both as his telephone number, and as an advertising feature.6 7 Shortly thereafter, Sklar applied for federal service mark registration of the telephone number I-N-J-U-R-Y-9. 68 Three weeks later,
Dranoff-Perlstein Associates applied for registration of I-N-J-U-R-Y- 1 as
a federally protected service mark. 69 After registering its mark, DranoffPerlstein filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, alleging unfair competition and trademark infringement under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act as a result of Sklar's
70
use of I-N-J-U-R-Y-9.
The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary
60. Id. at 194-95.
61. Id. at 195 (citing American Home Products v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.,
834 F.2d 368, 370 (3d Cir. 1987)).
62. Id. The Third Circuit concluded that "likelihood of confusion is an inevitable result of the concurrent use of the Guild marks." Id. Therefore, OAA
satisfied its burden of proving a likelihood of success on the merits. Id.
63. 967 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1992).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 853.
66. Id. The ad campaign featured "sixty-second radio advertisements on
several popular local radio stations; advertisements in the yellow pages of the
telephone book; and postage meter tapes with a telephone and the number I-NJ-U-R-Y-I prominently featured." Id. at 853-54. For example, one advertisement read: "Injured? Dial I-N-J-U-R-Y-I for all accident cases and personal injury claims." Id. at 854 n.3.
67. Id. at 854. Sklar used the I-N-J-U-R-Y-9 number prominently in radio
spots, advertisements in the local telephone directory, and in newsletters and
handbills. Id.
68. Id. For a discussion of the procedure for registering a trade or service
mark, see KANE, supra note 13, at 79-92.
69. Dranoff-Perlstein, 967 F.2d at 854.
70. Id. For the language of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, see text accompanying supra note 18.
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judgment, holding that the telephone number I-N-J-U-R-Y-1 was a generic term and therefore, not entitled to service mark protection. 7' The
district court alternatively noted, however, that even if the telephone
number were deemed descriptive, it had not acquired the secondary
meaning required to justify trademark protection. 72 The plaintiffs sub73
sequently appealed the district court's decision to the Third Circuit.
IV.

ANALYSIS

The Third Circuit began its analysis by focusing on whether marks
that corresponded to telephone numbers could acquire trademark protection.74 The Third Circuit acknowledged that many businesses, including law firms, generate business by telephone, and therefore
telephone numbers, like any other trademark, may serve to identify the
source of the service offered. 7 5 As a result, the Third Circuit concluded
that a telephone number may be protected as a trademark under the
Lanham Act.

76

71. Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs. v. Sklar, No. CIV. A. 90-5003, 1991 WL
63822, at *1 (E.D. Pa. April 19, 1991). The district court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, finding that the mnemonic I-N-J-U-R-Y-1 was not entitled to
trademark protection. Id. Judge Fullam held that the mark was functional, and
that it was designed to aid potential customers in remembering the telephone
number of the plaintiff. Id. at *2. Therefore, Judge Fullam concluded that the
mark was generic and thus, not entitled to trademark protection. Id.
72. Dranoff-Perlstein,967 F.2d at 854. For a discussion of descriptive terms
and the requirement of proving secondary meaning, see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
73. Id. at 853.
74. Id. at 855.
75. Id. The Third Circuit in Dranoff-Perlstein recognized that the "function
[of] a trademark [is to be] an indicator of source, sponsorship, approval, or affiliation." Id. at 856 (citing A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 305 (3d
Cir. 1986)). Therefore, the court concluded that "[t]o the extent a mark that
corresponds to a telephone number performs these functions, it may, if the
other requirements of trademark law are met, be entitled to trademark protection." Id.
The Dranoff-Perlstein court did state in a footnote that the fact that the mark
at issue corresponded to a telephone number was not relevant to the court's
determination unless "it limits the universe of possible alternative marks available to competitors." Id. at 855 n.6. As an example, the court noted that use of
the telephone number INJURY-I would prevent anyone else from using the
word "injury" in the beginning of his or her telephone number because the first
six digits of the two numbers would always be exactly alike. Id. The Third Circuit also recognized that "[clompanies doing significant business through telephone orders frequently promote their telephone numbers as a key
identification of the source of their products." Id. (quoting Dial-A-Mattress
Franchise Corp. v. Page, 880 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1988)). The Third Circuit cited
examples from the local directory, such as "DIAL-LAW" or Dial-DENTIST. Id.
at 855 n.7.
76. Id. at 857. The court acknowledged that most of the courts that addressed the issue concluded that trademarks corresponding to telephone numbers are protectible. Id. at 856 (citing Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page,

880 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that telephone numbers may be protected
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In continuing its analysis of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the
Third Circuit assessed whether the plaintiff's mark was sufficiently distinctive to warrant trademark protection. 77 The court concluded that
the term "I-N-J-U-R-Y" was generic because the term was "integrally
related to a 'distinctive characteristic' " of personal injury lawyers and
therefore, it had become so "commonly descriptive" of the service that
personal injury lawyers provide. 78 Furthermore, the Third Circuit reasoned that if the plaintiff could preclude other personal injury lawyers
from using the word "INJURY" in their own telephone numbers, the
plaintiff would gain the type of unfair competitive advantage that trademark law, and more specifically, the genericness doctrine, aims to prevent. 79 The Third Circuit recognized, however, that a court must assess
the distinctiveness of the mark by considering the mark in its entirety,
that is, the term INJURY plus the suffix 1.80 Consequently, the Third
Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine: first,
whether the mark, considered as a whole, had acquired a secondary
as trademarks); Murrin v. Midco Communications, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 1195, 1200
(D. Minn. 1989) (holding that "a confusingly similar use of a telephone number

can constitute either trademark infringement or unfair competition"); American
Airlines, Inc. v. 1-800-A-M-E-R-I-C-A-N, Corp., 622 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (protecting American Airline's telephone number as trademark)).
The Third Circuit rejected the view of the Second Circuit in Dial-A-Mattress
Franchise Corp. v. Page, 880 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1988), that a telephone number
is protectible even if it is a generic term. Id. at 857. The Third Circuit disagreed
with this approach and reasoned that "granting one firm ...[the] exclusive use

[of a generic term] would place competitors at a serious competitive disadvantage. Id. (citing 1

JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION

AND

PRACTICE

§ 2.02, at 2-23 (1991)).
77. Dranoff-Perlstein, 967 F.2d at 857. In Dranoff-Perstein, the Third Circuit,
first considered whether the mark INJURY-I was arbitrary. Dranoff-Perlstein,967
F.2d at 857. The court concluded that the mark was not arbitrary because the
phrase "INJURY-I" bears a logical relationship to the services rendered by personal injury lawyers. Id, Second, the court applied the "imagination" test and
concluded that the mark "INJURY-1" was not suggestive because very little imagination was necessary to draw the connection between the mark "INJURY-I"
and personal injury law. Id. at 858.
78. Id. at 860. For a discussion of the term "generic," see supra note 27 and
accompanying text.
In concluding that the word "INJURY" is generic, the Dranoff-Perlstein court
explained that the personal injury field has become a very specialized area of the
law, and consequently, competitors need to use the word "INJURY" to describe
the legal services they provide. Id. The court reasoned that if "no commonly
used alternative effectively communicates the same functional information, the
term . . .is generic." Id. at 859 (quoting A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808
F.2d 291, 300 (3d Cir. 1986)). Telephone numbers contain only an area code
and seven digits, and therefore, the court reasoned that if the term "INJURY"

were granted exclusively to Dranoff-Perlstein "the range of commonly used alternatives . . .[would be] severely limited." Id.
79. Dranoff-Perlstein, 967 F.2d at 859-60 (citing GILSON, supra note 76,
§ 2.02, at 2-23). For a discussion of the general purpose of trademark law and
unfair competition, see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
80. Dranoff-Perlstein,967 F.2d at 861.
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meaning that would render it worthy of protection under Section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act; and second, if the court deemed the mark to be
worthy of protection, whether a likelihood of confusion existed between
"I-N-J-U-R-Y-I" and "I-N-J-U-R-Y-9." 8' In reaching its decision, the
Third Circuit stated that the likelihood of confusion is a question of
fact. 8 2 The Dranoff-Perlsteincourt based this conclusion on its decision in
American Home Products.8 3 However, the Third Circuit offered this asser84
tion without any further explanation.
V.

CONCLUSION

Classifying the issue of likelihood of confusion as a question of fact
or a question of law is important because it determines the appropriate
standard for appellate review.8 5 Ascertaining the appropriate standard
of review is particularly significant because the clearly erroneous standard makes it difficult for an appellate court to overturn district court
findings. 8 6 Conversely, a de novo standard allows for a very broad scope
of appellate review.8 7 Therefore, a court's characterization of the likelihood of confusion as a question of law or as a question of fact may have
a decisive effect on the outcome of a trademark infringement case.
The Third Circuit had initially assessed the issue of likelihood of
confusion as a mixed question of law and fact in Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's
Liquid Gold, Inc.88 However, the Third Circuit expressly rejected this
view in American Home Products, Corp. v. Barr Laboratories,Inc.89 The American Home Products court held that the issue of likelihood of confusion is a
question of fact reviewable under a clearly erroneous standard of review. 90 Furthermore, the Third Circuit in American Home Products specifically rejected the mixed standard of review adopted in Scott Paper.9 '
Following the court's explicit articulation of the standard in American
Home Products, it is difficult to discern why the Third Circuit returned to a
81. Id.
82. Id. (stating that "likelihood of confusion [is] question of fact." (citing
American Home Products, Corp. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 834 F.2d 368, 370
(3d Cir. 1987))).
83. Id.at 862.
84. Id.
85. Reynolds, supra note 10, at 752.

86. For a discussion of the clearly erroneous standard of review, see supra
notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
87. For a discussion of the de novo standard of review, see supra note 33 and
accompanying text.
88. Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1229 (3d

Cir. 1978). For a further discussion of the Scott.Papercase, see supra notes 42-46
and accompanying text.

89. American Home Prods., Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 834 F.2d 368, 370
(3d Cir. 1987). For a further discussion of American Home Products, see supra
notes 47-57 and accompanying text..
90. American Home Products, 834 F.2d at 370.
91. Id.
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mixed question of fact and law analysis in Opticians Association v. Independent Opticians.9 2 Was the Opticians court carving out an exception to the
clearly erroneous standard of American Home Products for those limited
instances in which there are no facts in dispute? Or, was the Opticians
court simply misstating the law in the Third Circuit?
Adding to the confusion, the Dranoff-Perstein court subsequently
stated that the issue of the likelihood of confusion is a factual determination, relying on its decision in American Home Products.93 Can the adherence to the clearly erroneous standard in Dranoff-Perlstein be reconciled
with the mixed standard of review set forth in Opticians? Or did the Dranoff-Perlstein court conclude that Opticians created an "exception" to the
clearly erroneous standard that simply did not apply to the factual situation before it?
Although the court in Dranoff-Perlsteinexplicitly stated that the likelihood of confusion is a finding of fact, the Third Circuit has articulated a
94
standard in previous cases and then subsequenly failed to follow it.
Therefore, because the the Third Circuit has not consistently supported
a single standard of review, it is difficult to rely on the Third Circuit's
recent articulation of the standard in Dranoff-Perlstein. Moreover, the
Third Circuit in Dranoff-Perlstein did not provide any reasoning for its
decision. 95 Relying on its holding in American Home Products, the DranoffPerlstein court simply stated, with little elaboration, that the likelihood of
confusion is a question of fact. 96 Furthermore, the court in Dranoff-Perlstein did not acknowledge or distinguish its holding in Opticians, in which
it treated the likelihood of confusion as a mixed question of law and
fact. 9 7

Consequently, the proper standard of review for the issue of the
likelihood of confusion in trademark infringement cases in the Third
Circuit remains unclear. The definitive statement of the court in DranoffPerlstein, that the issue is reviewed as a question of fact, does little to
abate the confusion. The Third Circuit has pursued a policy that waivers between assessing the issue as a question of fact, and assessing the
issue as a mixed question of law and fact. Therefore, it is difficult for a
92. Opticians Ass'n of Am. v. Independent Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187,
195 (3d Cir. 1990). For a further discussion of Opticians, see supra notes 58-62
and accompanying text.
93. Dranoff-Perlstein v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 862 (3d Cir. 1992). For a further discussion of the Dranoff-Perlstein case, see supra notes 64-84 and accompanying text.
94. For a discussion of the cases depicting the wavering policy of the Third
Circuit, see supra notes 42-84 and accompanying text.
95. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's reasoning as to the proper standard of review for the likelihoof of confusion in Dranoff-Perlstein,see supra notes
82-84 and accompanying text.
96. Dranoff-Perlstein, 967 F.2d at 862.
97. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's decision in Opticians, see supra
notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
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practitioner in the Third Circuit to ascertain the appropriate standard of
review for this issue. The confusion will, undoubtedly, continue until
the Supreme Court finally grants certiorari and resolves the issue, or
until the Third Circuit makes a definitive statement.
Jacqueline Pasquarella
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